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STATISTICAL ERROR AND LEGAL ERROR
Type One and Type Two Errors and the Law
R.S. Radford*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps,1 the Supreme Court wres-
tled with the fundamental inadequacy of the legal system as a means of
determining truth. Justice O'Connor expressed the Court's frustration in
the context of libel suits:
There will always be instances when the fact finding process
will be unable to resolve conclusively whether.., speech is true
or false; it is in those cases that the burden of proof is disposi-
tive. Under a rule forcing the plaintiff to bear the burden of
showing falsity, there will be some cases in which plaintiffs can-
not meet their burden despite the fact that the speech is in fact
false.... Similarly, under an alternative rule placing the bur-
den of showing truth on defendants, there would be some cases
in which defendants could not bear their burden despite the
fact that the speech is in fact true .... Under either rule, then,
the outcome of the suit will sometimes be at variance with the
outcome that we would desire if all speech were either demon-
strably true or demonstrably false.2
Justice O'Connor's concern with the consequences of uncertainty
and error was by no means unique. These issues have a long history in
Western jurisprudence, reaching into all branches of the law. The Htepps
passage is noteworthy mainly for its clarity in highlighting two important
points. First, the decision implies a model in which all defamatory state-
ments are either true or false in some objective sense. The accuracy of
judicial fact-finding can therefore be verified, at least in theory, by refer-
ence to objective reality. This is a completely arbitrary assumption, but
one without which the fact-finding process would be meaningless.
Second, Justice O'Connor observes that legal decisions may fail to
coincide with objective truth, and that this divergence may take either of
* B.S.B.A., Rockhurst College; M.A., University of Southern California; J.D., Univer-
sity of Southern California. I am grateful for helpful comments by Matt Spitzer, Richard
Craswell, Karen Lash and Duane Okamoto.
1. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
2. Id. at 776.
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two forms. Through this observation she echoes commentators such as
Schauer,3 Redish 4 and Epstein.5 Furthermore, the Hepps opinion implic-
itly recognizes that, for a given quantity and quality of evidence, a trade-
off exists between the two types of error. Reducing the number of erro-
neous convictions (or judgments for plaintiffs) is normally achieved at
the cost of more erroneous acquittals (or judgments for defendants).6
The Hepps dilemma, seen in this light, seems remarkably similar to the
general statistical concept of Type I and Type II errors.' However, this
identification has been strongly resisted by jurists and scholars who claim
that legal decision-making cannot (or should not) be analogized to the
quantitative methods of social science. This Article will review the main
themes of this dispute, and it will show that a legal model based on statis-
3. Schauer has written:
[E]rrors produced can be errors of under-inclusion or errors of over-inclusion. Be-
cause we do not have certain knowledge of the true state of affairs, we cannot be
absolutely certain that a verdict of innocent is not a decision to free one who is in fact
guilty (an error of under-inclusion), or that a verdict of guilty is not a decision to
punish one who is in fact innocent (an error of over-inclusion).
F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 137 (1982).
4. Redish has observed:
If the asserted governmental interest is of overwhelming importance... and there is
serious doubt concerning the viability of less restrictive means of achieving that end,
the risk of an overestimation of the viability of alternative measures might be signifi-
cant, and might cause the Court to think twice before it invalidates legislation on
overbreadth grounds. If, on the other hand, the government interest, while not in-
substantial, is such that no overriding threat to physical safety or national security
would result from failure to promote it, the Court might be more willing to take the
risk of overestimating the viability of less drastic means.
M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPREssION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 235 (1984).
What Redish does not make explicit is that the Court must weigh these risks under uncer-
tainty as to both the seriousness of the threat to state interests and the viability of less restric-
tive means.
5. "The constant challenge ... is to balance two kinds of error. Errors of overinclusion
occur when the regulation sweeps wider than necessary to control the identified evil; those of
underinclusion occur when the regulation does not reach all instances of the evil in question."
R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 127-28
(1985).
6. Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 103
n.13. The same two kinds of error, and the relationship between them, have been recognized
in the application of administrative regulations. See Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertis-
ing, 65 B.U.L. REV. 657, 678, 710-13 (1985).
7. For an explanation of Type I and Type II errors, see infra text accompanying note 57.
Justice O'Connor's account of the problem is a special case because both types of error
may occur regardless of which party bears the burden of proof. Defendants may be judged to
have satisfied their burden even when the speech was in fact false; when plaintiffs bear the
burden they may prevail even though the speech was in fact true. In these cases it is equally
true that the outcome will "be at variance with the outcome we would desire if all speech were
either demonstrably true or demonstrably false." Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 74-122.
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tical error can be especially useful in evaluating the impact of alternative
standards and burdens of proof.
II. UNCERTAINTY AND ERROR
A. Uncertainty and the Law
Regardless of whether reality is objectively determinate, 9 human be-
ings lack the means of knowing reality with certainty.' 0 The available
data are always imperfect, as is our ability to interpret the data." What
we call knowledge of facts is more accurately described as an awareness
of a distribution of probabilities.
"Probabilities are as real as masses," said H. Margenau. Yet
the truth is rather the reverse: masses are as real as probabili-
ties. Indeed, anything we can now say about masses depends
on what we can say about probabilities .... The verification of
propositions about probabilities is . . . the only fundamental
issue. Everything else depends upon this verification.12
Saying that X has been proven true amounts to a claim that X has been
associated with a very high probability. Conversely, saying that X is very
highly probable can be the equivalent of claiming that X is true. Esti-
mates of the likelihood of X can serve to express either our certainty of
truth or the extent of our ignorance. 3
The problem of uncertainty is especially acute in the context of tri-
als. An essential function of a trial is the resolution of uncertainty.' 4 Yet
uncertainty always implies error. While courts are required to resolve
disputes of fact and law, the evidence is always doubtful; even a defend-
ant's confession or admission of fault cannot raise the probability of guilt
or liability to 100%.11 Worse, the facts in dispute usually involve past
9. The assumption of objective determinacy, which underlay Justice O'Connor's opinion
in Hepps, will be employed throughout this Article.
10. See, e.g., R. NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981).
11. See Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and
Rules, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1986).
12. N. GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, THE ENTRoPy LAW AND THE ECONOMIC PROCESS 54 (4th
printing 1981) (footnote omitted).
13. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L.
REv. 807, 809 (1961).
14. Zeisel, Statistics as Legal Evidence, 15 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. So. 246, 246
(1968). Of course, uncertainty can be "resolved" in at least two different ways. One is to
actually determine the underlying truth of the matter; the other is to settle the issue by declara-
tory fiat. Which of these methods is more appropriate to judicial factfinding is disputed. See
infra text accompanying notes 83-92.
15. See Jaffee, Of Probativity and Probability: Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the
Calculus of Chance At Trial, 46 U. Prmr. L. REv. 925, 935 (1985).
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events. Even if crystal-clear evidence was once available, its utility may
have faded or disappeared before it could be presented in court. Thus,
from a purely practical viewpoint, certainty of legally relevant facts may
never be attainable without the aid of time travel. 6
Uncertainty is also felt in the legal process at other levels. This Ar-
ticle, like most of the existing literature on the subject, will deal mainly
with "rule uncertainty"-uncertainty in the application of legal rules to
individuals. Rule uncertainty is a fairly obvious phenomenon, having di-
rectly observable effects in the form of erroneous verdicts and other out-
comes. However, legal rules are not imposed for their own sake. In most
cases they are intended to have some incentive effect in influencing social
behavior."7 The incentives created by a given rule may or may not pro-
mote the behavior the rule seeks to encourage-a situation that might be
described as "incentive uncertainty." Incentive uncertainty reflects the
risk of specification error (a simple mismatch between the formulation of
a rule and the desired behavioral norm) and the risk of error in predict-
ing incentive effects. Behavioral incentives are shaped not by rules per
se, but by rules as they are applied-including any uncertainty in their
application. Thus, it may sometimes happen that rules entailing unnec-
essary risks of error in application create optimal incentives for comply-
ing with desired behavioral norms.' 8 Do courts use the dynamics of
uncertainty in this way, accepting rule uncertainty and errors at trial in
order to maximize compliance with underlying norms? No evidence ex-
ists that courts possess the sophistication needed to pursue a conscious
policy of this sort. Nonetheless, any model of legal uncertainty must
recognize this dimension of the issue.
B. Legal Accommodation of Uncertainty and Error
Although it is seldom examined and leaves some unmoved,
19
awareness of the risk of error pervades the theory and practice of law.20
Its presence can be felt in the requirements of due process and the prac-
16. See Kaye, Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments, and the Burden of Proof A Response to
Dr. Cohen's Reply, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 642.
17. See, e-g., Leubsdorf, Remedies For Uncertainty, 61 B.U.L. REV. 132 (1981).
18. See, eg., Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L. ECON.
& ORGANizATON 2 (1986).
19. "[Hie who falls by a mistaken sentence, may be considered as falling for his country."
Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, in 3 THE WORKS OF WILLIAM PALEY, D.D. 315, 315
(1838), quoted in Birmingham, Remarks on "Probability" in Law: Mostly, a Casenote and a
Book Review, 12 GA. L. REv. 535, 537 (1978).
20. See, e.g., Radin, Risk-Of-Error Rules and Non-Ideal Justification, 28 NOMOS 33 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1986).
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tice of deferring to precedent. A conscious risk of error is implicit in the
structure of criminal penalties, as in the practice of punishing attempted
crimes less severely than completed crimes.2' The potential cost of error
is a factor in determining the amount of resources devoted to litigation,22
and the risk of error has been cited as a reason for not awarding punitive
damages in tort cases.23 Posner has described the purpose of legal proce-
dures as the minimization of direct costs plus the costs of error.24 This is
consistent with the Supreme Court's practice in procedural due process
cases of balancing the marginal costs of stricter procedural protections
against the marginal benefits of reduced error.2" Finally, the law's ac-
commodation of uncertainty and error is nowhere more evident than in
the assignment of the burden and choice of a standard of proof.
1. The standard of proof
Courts do not attempt to establish the certainty of disputed facts,
but only their probability under the circumstances presented by the evi-
dence.26 The law recognizes that some degree of uncertainty will persist
to the conclusion of trial. It therefore specifies the residual doubt com-
patible with a finding of guilt or liability, expressed as the appropriate
standard of proof. These standards are simply guidelines as to the un-
resolved risk of error that courts are willing to accept when reaching a
decision. The amount of residual uncertainty tolerated by a standard
tends to vary inversely with the potential loss risked by defendants in
cases coming under it.2" Regardless of the magnitude of the potential
loss, however, even the strictest standard is understood to mean some-
thing less than proof to an absolute certainty.28
In most civil litigation, proof is established by a preponderance of
the evidence.29 On its face, the preponderance standard simply means
21. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.3 (3d ed. 1986).
22. See, eg., id. at § 7.2.
23. See, eg., id. at § 6.10.
24. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399, 399-401 (1973).
25. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
26. See Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.
FORUM 23, 26-27.
27. In at least one field of law, the Court has rejected the reasonable doubt standard specif-
ically because the state might never be able to win a case under it. See Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
28. Bass, Gesser & Mount, Scientific Statistical Methodology and the Doctrine of "Reason-
able Doubt" in Criminal Law; (With Special Reference to the Breath Analysis for Blood Alco-
hol) Empirical Fact or Legal Fiction?, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 350 (1979).
29. See, eg., R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 797
(2d ed. 1982).
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that something has been shown to be more probable than not.30 More
formally, the standard can be said to require a showing of probabilities
greater than 0.5,31 or "odds of at least 51 to 49 that such-and-such has
taken place or will do so.,,32
However, a fact proven for some judicial purposes is not necessarily
proven for others. For some quasi-criminal issues, proof must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence, 33 while criminal convictions require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 34 These differing standards can be in-
terpreted as variations in the degree of probability needed to establish
issues bearing on guilt or liability.35 This is the sense in which Zeisel
refers to standards of proof as "canon[s] of probability. '36 A require-
ment of proof to an absolute certainty would be tantamount to saying
that there must be a 100% probability that a premise is true.37 Below
this extreme case, transforming standards of proof into probability esti-
mates requires some arbitrariness. For instance, if the preponderance
standard can be expressed as a probability greater than 0.5, then proof
beyond a reasonable doubt might be defined as a probability greater than
0.9 or 0.95.38 In any event, no reason exists to suppose the standards
cannot be quantified.39 Indeed, research has shown that judges can in
fact assign probability values to standards of proof.' In a 1969 survey,
state and federal judges associated the phrase "beyond a reasonable
30. See Kaye, Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1980). But see Brook, Inevitable
Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation, 18 TULSA L.J. 79, 88-
96 (1982) (requiring "actual belief" of truth of contested facts). Cohen takes yet another ap-
proach, showing that two probabilistic variables are involved in reaching verdicts: (1) the
threshold probability of guilt (generally defined as >0.50; i.e., more probable than not) and (2)
the confidence level used in constructing the interval estimate about this figure. N. Cohen,
Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985). In Cohen's model, the key variable for distinguishing between
standards of proof is the confidence level. I use the more traditional approach, varying the
threshold probability.
31. See Brook, supra note 30, at 85. But see Jaffee, supra note 15, at 936-38 (preponder-
ance standard interpreted as weight of evidence, not probability).
32. Lord Simon of Glaisdale, quoted in R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND
PROBABILITY 132 (2d ed. 1983).
33. See, e.g., R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 29.
34. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
35. See Broun & Kelly, supra note 26, at 26-27.
36. Zeisel, supra note 14, at 246.
37. Bass, Gesser & Mount, supra note 28, at 351.
38. Kaye, supra note 6, at 103.
39. See Williams, The Mathematics of Proof-I, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 297, 303.
40. Simon, Judges' Translations of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability, 1969
THE TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 103. This study suffers from serious methodological defects, stem-
ming in part from a low response rate. See id. at 104-06. For comparisons of quantitative
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doubt" with a mean probability of 89%;4I "by a preponderance of the
evidence" was associated with a mean probability of 61%.42
What is the point of using tougher standards of proof in criminal
and quasi-criminal cases? More stringent proof is meant to require
greater certainty-i.e., a higher degree of probability-in cases involving
more costly errors. Despite references to balancing their risks, the legal
system does not always regard the two kinds of error as equally
weighted. This is especially clear in criminal trials, where Anglo-Ameri-
can procedures still reflect Blackstone's dictum that it is better for ten
guilty defendants to go free than for one of the innocent to be punished.43
In economic terms, convicting the innocent involves greater negative ex-
ternalities-social costs beyond those borne by the parties-than acquit-
ting the guilty.' The various standards try to balance the relative costs
of the two types of error, given that the costs of errors against defendants
are accorded greater weight as they rise.4"
Changes in standards of proof implicitly trade off one sort of error
for the other. In Addington v. Texas,46 the Supreme Court came close to
suggesting that errors in favor of plaintiffs occur under the preponder-
ance standard simply because factfinders do not take the cost of error
seriously enough. "Increasing the burden of proof is one way to impress
the factfinder with the importance of the decision and thereby perhaps to
reduce the chances" of erroneous decisions.47 Yet in the same opinion,
Chief Justice Burger described the reasonable doubt standard as an at-
interpretations by judges, jurors and students, see Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of
Proof- A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 L. & Soc'y REv. 319 (1971).
In a similar study at the University of Manchester, however, subjects were reported to
have grossly varied in their interpretation of the reasonable doubt standard. One-third fixed it
below .70, while another one-third put it above .90. R. EGGLESTON, supra note 32, at 118-19,
citing J. COHEN & I. CHRISTENSEN, INFORMATION AND CHOICE 62 (1970).
41. Simon, supra note 40, at 108.
42. Id. at 112.
43. See Zeisel, supra note 14, at 246-47. See also Nagel & Neef, Deductive Modeling to
Determine an Optimum Jury Size and Fraction Required to Convict, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 933,
945-46. Both Fortescue and Frederick the Great apparently preferred a ratio of twenty-to-one
in favor of acquitting the guilty. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of
Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 882 (1968). Fletcher
notes the seeming anomaly that the common law often shifts the burden of proof to defendants
pleading a justification or excuse in murder cases. Id. at 882-83. This implies a preference to
condemn wrongly a defendant who killed in self defense, rather than to mitigate the charges
against a knowing murderer.
44. See R. POSNER, supra note 21, at § 21.3.
45. See Brook, supra note 30, at 85; Thompson, Liability and Individualized Evidence, 49
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 199, 215 (1986).
46. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
47. Id. at 427.
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tempt to minimize the risk of erroneous convictions "even at the risk that
some who are guilty might go free."48 This description obscures the key
point that some who are guilty will go free (and some who are innocent
will be convicted) under any standard applied in American courts. Ap-
plying the reasonable doubt test means that more of the guilty will be
allowed to go free, as a cost of reducing the number of innocent who
would be convicted under a less rigorous standard.
Whether innocent defendants actually benefit from more stringent
standards of proof depends on whether there is an offsetting adjustment
in the severity of penalties. A given level of deterrence may be achieved
by relatively light penalties at the preponderance standard, or relatively
heavy penalties under the reasonable doubt standard. It is not obvious
how to gauge the social benefit of convicting fewer of the innocent, but
sentencing them to longer terms.4 9
2. The burden of proof
In Hepps, Justice O'Connor observed how the placement of the bur-
den of proof affects the relative risk of the two types of error.5 0 As she
implied, this burden can be shifted from one party to the other to correct
what the courts perceive as an imbalance between the two risks. The
burden of proof is composed of the burden of production (the require-
ment of advancing evidence to support one's case) and the burden of
persuasion (the requirement that one's case must meet some threshold of
plausibility)."1 This Article emphasizes the burden of persuasion, but the
analysis will apply generally to the burden of production as well.
The significance of the burden of persuasion is that, when the evi-
dence on a disputed point is evenly balanced (allowing for the relevant
standard of proof), the party bearing the burden loses.5 2 Some of these
"tie" verdicts will be mistaken, and all of the mistakes will go against the
same side. By shifting the burden of persuasion, the courts shift this
block of errors from defendants to plaintiffs or vice versa. This can be an
effective way of announcing a judicial reevaluation of the relative costs of
error.
53
48. Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
49. See G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 82-
86 (1980).
50. See supra text accompanying note 2.
51. See Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 13, 15 n.11 (1983).
52. See R. EGGLESTON, supra note 32, at 105.
53. See citations in Kaye, supra note 51, at 16-17.
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C. Statistical Error and Legal Error
In some sense, every trial can be viewed as a hypothesis test.54 The
disputed issues are generally empirical propositions, which may be
shown to be more or less probable under the circumstances of the case,
but can seldom be proven as absolutely true.5 5 In criminal cases the pre-
sumption of innocence is analogous to the null hypothesis that the de-
fendant is not guilty. In civil trials the null hypothesis is that the party
who does not bear the burden of proof should prevail. Establishing guilt
or liability requires evidence sufficiently probative to meet the standard
of proof. That is, the data tested must be conclusive enough to reject the
null hypothesis at a specified confidence level.56
Statisticians are familiar with two types of error that may arise in
testing hypotheses. Rejecting a null hypothesis that is in fact true is
known as Type I error; accepting (failing to reject) a hypothesis that is in
fact false is Type II error.5 7 In general, an inverse relationship exists
between the relative incidence of the two kinds of error.5 8 Type I errors
can be reduced merely by increasing the level of confidence needed to
reject the null hypothesis; however, this will simultaneously increase the
risk of Type II error.59 In a model of trials as hypothesis tests, Type I
errors would be mistaken convictions or findings of liability; Type II er-
rors would be mistaken verdicts in favor of defendants.6' For example,
imagine a new evidentiary rule excluding identifications based on police
54. For a review of hypothesis testing and the use of null hypotheses, see R.
WEHMHOEFER, STATISTICS IN LITIGATION: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR LAWYERS
§ 3.25 et. seq. (1985). The model of trials as hypothesis tests is clearest for binary verdict sets:
guilty or not guilty, liable or not liable. For decisions along a continuum, such as determining
the amount of damages or the length of discretionary sentences, the simple analogy to statisti-
cal tests would not apply.
55. See Ball, supra note 13.
56. "At the ninety-five percent confidence level, five percent of all defendants who would
win if their true probability of liability were known will incorrectly lose." Cohen, supra note
30, at 411.
57. See, eg., T. WONNACOr'r & R. WONNACOTr, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR BusI-
NESS AND ECONOMICS 272-73 (3d ed. 1984); P. EwART, J. FORD & C. LIN, APPLIED MANA-
GERIAL STATISTICS 188-93 (1982).
58. Although the two risks of error are inversely related, they are not simple complements.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 30. The combined risks of Type I and Type II error would equal
unity only on the assumption that all cases are decided incorrectly. If decisions were handed
down randomly there should be a 50 percent likelihood that neither error will occur. See infra
note 60 and accompanying text.
59. R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 54, at § 3.27.
60. The probability of Type I error is traditionally designated as a; the risk of Type II
error is 13. The relationship between the two kinds of error can be illustrated with a contin-
gency table:
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line-ups. Assuming that both guilty and innocent defendants are some-
times convicted on the marginal weight of such evidence, exclusion
would reduce the number of mistaken convictions (lowering Type I er-
ror), but simultaneously increase the number of mistaken acquittals (rais-
ing Type II error).
The Anglo-American legal system has traditionally reserved its
greatest concern for avoiding Type I errors.6 ' Presumably, it would be
ideal to reduce the risk of such errors to zero.62 However, since this is
statistically impossible so long as defendants are tried and found guilty,
what should be the practical goal? At least five alternative approaches to
legal error have been advanced:63
1. Ignore the problem."
2. Minimize total errors.65
3. Minimize the cost of errors.66
4. Equalize the incidence of errors.67
5. Minimize the number of large errors.68
Each of these policies would require a different matrix of standards and
F _ I DECISION I
Defendant Is
Innocent Correct Decision Type II Error
[Not Liable] (Probability: 1-6) (Probability: /3)
61. See, pg., E stein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CATO J. 711,
717 (1985).
62. See, eg., T. WONNACOTT & R. WONNAcOTr, supra note 57; P. EWART, J. FORD & C.
LIN, supra note 57.
63. The five general approaches listed here are ways of directly coping (or refusing to cope)
with uncertainty and error. Another option is to treat legal error as an indirect or instrumen-
tal element of the system. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
64. See, eg., Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. Rnv. 1329 (1971).
65. See, e.g., Friedman, Trial by Jury: Criteria for Convictions, Jury Size and Type I and
Type II Errors, 26 AM. STATISTICIAN 21 (1972).
66. See, eg., Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. Rsv.
34 (1979).
67. See, ag., G. TULLOCK, supra note 49.
68. See Orloff & Stedinger,,4 Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance of the Evidence
Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1159 (1983).
For Plaintiff For Defendant
Defendant Is
Guilty Type I Error Correct Decision
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procedures. A full understanding of the issues requires a closer look at
the nature of legal and statistical error.
A trial is an exercise in inferring reality from the appearance of real-
ity. The appearance perceived by the court depends on the quality and
quantity of evidence, and the skill with which it is presented. To illus-
trate, consider the problem addressed in Hepps, of determining whether a
defamatory statement was true or false. All such statements can be





P 2  P
FIGURE 1: Apparent Truth of Defamatory Statements
In Figure 1, the defamations occurring in any time period are as-
sumed to be normally distributed along the Apparent Truth dimension.69
(The exact shape of the distribution depends on the efficiency of rules of
evidence and procedure, and related constraints.) All potentially litiga-
ble cases are included in the distribution, but no potential litigant knows
69. The location of the curve will depend in part on the prevailing level of defamatory
statements in society. This is treated as exogenous here, but in fact an endogenous link could
be specified between the outcomes of defamation cases and the position of the curve.
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precisely where his or her case is located. This is because specification of
the crucial variable, the appearance of truth, ultimately depends on the
perceptions of a court. A priori, each potential case is associated with its
own probability distribution centered on some point in Figure 1.70
If truth were the only defense, the risk of liability for publishing a
given defamation would depend on two factors: (1) the standard of proof
and (2) the burden of persuasion. In Figure 1, if the standard of proof is
set at P1, all statements to the left of this point will be judged false, and
their publishers will be held liable. If the standard is set at P2, many
more statements (those falling within the shaded area) can be published
with impunity.
The distribution in Figure 1 can be conceptually broken down into
component distributions of statements that are "actually" true or false,
as in Figure 2. These distributions (labeled T and F, respectively) will
overlap so long as the most credible false statement seems more plausible
than the least credible true statement. The extent of the overlap depends
largely on the effectiveness of the factfinding process.
Figure 2 highlights the problem of Type I and Type II error. Setting
the standard of proof at P1 rather than at P2 minimizes the number of
false statements that are judged to be true, thereby reducing Type II er-
ror (mistaken acquittals). However, it simultaneously increases the
number of true statements that are wrongly judged to be false, thereby
increasing Type I error (mistaken findings of liability). Setting the stan-
dard at P2 simply reverses the trade-off.
70. These distributions depend partly on the amount of resources devoted to litigation.
See, eg., R. POSNER, supra note 21, at § 21.8. Therefore, litigants have at least some marginal
control over the appearance of their claim, depending on the resources they are able and will-
ing to commit. The problem of uncertain placement is especially acute when a potential de-
fendant does not know prior to litigation whether a published story is true. Cf. Sheer &
Zardkoohi, An Analysis of the Economic Efficiency of the Law of Defamation, 80 Nw. U.L.
REv. 364, 412 (1985) (strict liability rule suppresses publication of true statements that are not
known to be true at time of publication decision).
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FIGURE 2: Component Distributions by Actual Truth or Falsity
Shifting the burden of proof has a similar effect. If the apparent
truth of statement S corresponds to the point where the standard of proof
is set, liability will depend on which party bears the burden. Statement S
and the set of all equally credible statements will be judged true if the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, but false if the burden lies with the
defendant. This set of statements will include some that are actually
true, and some that are false. Shifting the burden of proof between the
parties therefore affects the marginal incidence of Type I and Type II
error in a way equivalent to changing the standard of proof.71
D. Objections to the Statistical Model
Nearly a decade ago, in Ballew v. Georgia,72 Justice Blackmun rec-
71. This is, of course, the situation described by Justice O'Connor in Hepps. See supra text
accompanying note 2.
72. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
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ognized the operation of Type I and Type II errors in jury verdicts.73
This opinion stands as the only one where the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged the equivalence of legal and statistical error. Courts and
commentators generally have been reluctant to view judicial decision-
making as a statistical process. Some critics argue that such models are
fundamentally inappropriate, regardless of the apparent closeness of the
statistical analogy. Others claim that, while the legal system may accu-
rately be described in probabilistic terms, the familiar Pascalian system
of mathematical probabilities is unsuited to the task. This Subsection
reviews the leading variations of these arguments and suggests that none
of them seriously compromises the theoretical value of a statistical model
of judicial error.
1. The comfortable illusion of certainty
The traditional reluctance to identify legal truth with probabilities
may be a holdover from the age of trial by combat or ordeal-procedures
by which the truth of competing claims was settled absolutely by divine
revelation.74 Indeed, the tie to divinity may still exist in the minds of
some. "When people believed in divine intervention they also believed
that true innocence would prevail. In some respects the jury trial still
provides a test of innocence in a way that a statistically geared trial can-
not.... To be believed by a jury seems tantamount to receiving a special
moral dispensation."75 Whether or not this is so, it is a hallmark of the
legal process that once a fact is established at trial as sufficiently prob-
able, it is thereafter treated as if it were absolutely true.76 For practical
purposes, these determinations amount to assertions of objective reality:
facts either exist or they do not-statements are either true or false. To
think of truth as a matter of degree, as though facts could be partly true
and partly false, is alien to this perspective.77
A fine psychological line exists between accepting judgments as de-
finitive and actually believing in their certainty. When analysts demand
belief rather than merely acceptance, they confuse what the system is
capable of generating (acceptable verdicts) with what it is not (verdicts
that are certain). Nevertheless, the simple recognition of inevitable error
sometimes seems unbearable:
73. Id. at 234. Only Justice Stevens joined in Justice Blackmun's opinion of the Court,
dealing with optimal jury size. The relevant analysis drew heavily on Nagel & Neef, supra
note 43.
74. Ball, supra note 13, at 810.
75. Zuckerman, Law, Fact, or Justice?, 66 B.U.L. REv. 487, 506 (1986).
76. Ball, supra note 13, at 808.
77. Id. at 808-09.
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[If we were to set reasonable doubt at ninety-nine percent, are
we willing to say that a jury need only be ninety-nine percent
sure of its decision, when to do so would be to admit that we
would tolerate the conviction of one innocent man out of every
hundred convicted?78
What is remarkable about this passage is that it describes how the law
actually functions every day; what troubles the authors is the possibility
that we might admit it. Denial of this everyday reality has been vigor-
ously championed by Lawrence Tribe, who suggests that there may be
something "intrinsically immoral" about returning a verdict against a
defendant while knowing that one might be wrong.7 9 Tribe goes on to
maintain that the immorality lies not so much in our actual awareness of
doubt as in being forced to "proclaim" this awareness.8"
It is not always clear whether Tribe's position is wholly normative,
or if he claims that the law really does not allow convictions when the
court is aware of a measurable risk of error.8 The same ambiguity some-
times arises in similar objections posed by others.8 2 What is clear is that
Tribe's animosity to probabilistic models is based on his view of trials as
social ritual. As he ultimately puts it, "[T]he process, and not the result
in any particular case, is all important., 83 Unfortunately, Tribe cuts
away his own normative ground with this comment. After all, the worst
he can say of his opponents is that their search for precision may lead to
erroneous convictions by jurors bedazzled by mathematics.8 4 Yet Tribe
himself ultimately admits his willingness to accept mistaken verdicts-as
the price, not of precision, but of ritual.
Charles Nesson has staked out a position close to Tribe's, based on
the view that trials are primarily vehicles for settling disputes, not deter-
mining truth." Nesson fears that verdicts will lose their effectiveness if
they are understood to be based on degrees of belief in evidence. 86 Nes-
78. Broun & Kelly, supra note 26, at 31.
79. Tribe, supra note 64, at 1372.
80. Id. at 1373.
81. See id. at 1374; Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof, 84 HARV. L. REv.
1810, 1818 (1971).
82. See, eg., Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065,
1073 (1968).
83. Tribe, supra note 64, at 1381 (emphasis in original).
84. Id.
85. Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontiers of Knowledge,
66 B.U.L. REv. 521 (1986); Nesson, The Evidence Or The Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357 (1985); Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Per-
missive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1187 (1979).
86. See Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?, supra note 85.
858 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:843
son's argument combines two strands that are related only by assertion.
Clearly, even if the main function of trials is to resolve disputes, probabil-
istic models might still have value. If such tools can increase the accu-
racy of outcomes without impeding the court's ability to reach decisions
(an empirical question), the first element of Nesson's objection loses its
force. The remainder of his position collapses into a variant of Tribe's
argument: (1) the function of trials is to settle disputes in a socially ac-
ceptable way; (2) socially acceptable settlements must include ritualistic
claims of infallibility; (3) therefore probabilistic models are never appro-
priate, even if they enhance accuracy at no cost to facilitating settle-
ments. The main flaw in this argument lies in its empirically doubtful
second premise-that popular acceptance demands infallibility.
Although this claim is also a cornerstone of Tribe's argument,87 neither
author has shown that it is true-nor why, if true, it should be accepted
as inviolate by those who seek to improve the system.8 In particular, the
premise that acceptance rests on infallibility seems no more plausible
than the alternative that "[t]he legitimacy of our judicial system ... de-
pends on the popular assumption that the system produces decisions
based on accurate factfinding." 9
Nesson's latest work90 so blurs the contours of his argument that it
seems in danger of becoming a semantic game. "At some point," he ac-
knowledges, "high probability alone is sufficient to produce an acceptable
verdict."'" But this admission is tempered by his use of "probable" to
mean an outcome that "best accomplishes a just and acceptable resolu-
tion of the dispute." 92
It is hard to avoid the impression that arguments from ritual and
acceptability reduce to little more than comfortable self-deception. Prob-
abilistic models hold the risk of error before our eyes; rejecting the model
offers a pretense for claiming that errors will not occur.93 The best re-
sponse to this line of reasoning has already been given:
It may soothe the conscience of everyone if courtroom contro-
versies were decided and pronouncements made only on the ba-
sis of what is held to be "actual belief" in their wisdom. This
87. Tribe, supra note 64, at 1372-75.
88. See Brook, The Use of Statistical Evidence of Identiication in Civil Litigation: Well-
Worn Hypotheticals, Real Cases, and Controversy, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 293, 335-38 (1985).
89. Gold, Jury Wobble: Judicial Tolerance of Jury Inferential Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
391, 405 (1986).
90. Nesson, Agent Orange, supra note 85.
91. Id. at 522 n.3.
92. Id. at 521.
93. See Williams, supra note 39, at 304.
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practice certainly appears more appropriate than that of relying
on the best guess in even the most important situations. But
... the conscientious juror is enmeshed in a difficult position
from which he has no easy escape. Uncertainty makes edu-
cated guessers of everyone.94
Understandably, jurors (and judges) would prefer to believe in the
certainty of their decisions because it is unpleasant to consider the conse-
quences of error. However, these unpleasant consequences-from com-
mitting a guiltless person to death to pushing a business into bankruptcy
through a successful tort fraud-are an essential fact of the legal system.
Minimizing the cost of errors will be impossible unless we are willing to
admit that they exist.
2. Confused jurors or confused analysis?
The inability of jurors to understand complex mathematical stan-
dards is sometimes cited as an objection to probabilistic legal models."
However, one may wonder whether the average juror is as awed and
mystified by statistics as these scholars contend.96 Eggleston cites a curi-
ous case in which an Australian jury specifically asked a judge to define
the level of probability corresponding to the reasonable doubt standard;
the judge refused to comply." Whatever lesson may be drawn from this,
Eggleston is simply wrong to infer that "it is impossible to specify any
particular mathematical level of probability which must be achieved
before a verdict of guilty can be returned in a criminal case."
98
More important, this argument fails to distinguish between the use
of statistical evidence and statistical models of the decision-making pro-
cess.99 One can accept the probabilistic nature of proof for purposes of
presenting certain kinds of evidence while rejecting the view that legal
procedures can (or should) be interpreted in probabilistic terms-or vice
versa. 1°  Even if all purely statistical evidence were barred from the
94. Brook, supra note 30, at 92.
95. See Broun & Kelly, supra note 26, at 31; Tribe, supra note 64.
96. For example, the California Supreme Court may be accused of hyperbole in describing
mathematics as "a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society," that stands ready to "cast a
spell over" triers of fact. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 320,438 P.2d 33, 33, 66 Cal. Rptr.
497, 497 (1968).
97. R. EGGLESTON, supra note 32, at 114.
98. Id.
99. See Schmalbeck, The Trouble With Statistical Evidence, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
221, 231 (1986); Stripinis, Probability Theory and Circumstantial Evidence: Implications from
a Mathematical Analysis, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 59, 75 (1981).
100. See, eg., Tribe, supra note 64, at 1330-31; Leubsdorf, supra note 17, at 148; Broun &
Kelly, supra note 26, at 27.
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courtroom, to avoid confusion or for any other reason, a probabilistic
decision model might still capture the essence of the judicial process. 101
3. Questions of interpretation
Probability theory is not a monolithic system of thought. Several
distinct modes of probability analysis exist, and to some extent they are
incompatible and even mutually antagonistic.102 The most familiar inter-
pretation of probability is based on relative frequencies, i.e., on repeated
observations of identical or very similar events. In this sense, a valid
statistical claim that a ten percent probability exists of outcome X means
that X has been observed to occur in ten percent of all cases of the type
under review.10 3 "If there have been a thousand days with conditions
similar to today's and on one hundred of those days it has rained, the
probability of rain [today] is the fraction 100/1000, or ten percent."'1 4
In response, Tribe demands to know what it means to be "four-fifths
certain" in a given case.1 05 Although this criticism warps the meaning of
statistical confidence, 106 it makes the point that probabilities, to be ap-
plied at law, must be converted to specific propositions concerning par-
ticular cases.
10 7
Indeed, one alternative to the frequency-based interpretation is to
regard probabilities as expressing the evaluator's subjective confidence
that a fact is true. From this perspective, courts can be viewed as form-
ing subjective estimates of the probabilities associated with various possi-
ble sets of facts, and basing their decisions on these estimates. 0 8 In
answer to Tribe's "four-fifths certain" jibe,"09 Kaye would liken subjec-
101. This Article does not take up the question of whether any meaningful distinction exists
between "probabalistic" and "non-probabilistic" evidence. See, e.g., Kaye, The Admissibility
of "Probability Evidence" in Criminal Trials-Part II, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 160, 172 (1987);
Allen, A Reconceptualizatioh of Civil Trials, 66 B.U.L. REv. 401, 414-15 (1986); Leubsdorf,
supra note 17, at 148.
102. See N. GEORGESCUE-ROEGEN, supra note 12, at 52-59.
103. Ball, supra note 13, at 810-11.
104. Broun & Kelly, supra note 26, at 23-24.
105. Tribe, supra note 64, at 1347.
106. "[A] finding that is statistically significant at the .05 level ... is not an indication that
the conclusion is 95 percent correct. Instead, the conclusion is either correct or incorrect.
However, if this significance level is attained, the odds are 95 percent that the conclusion is
correct." Channels, The Methods of Social Science and Their Use in Legal Proceedings, 16
CONN. L. REv. 853, 870 (1984). See also the discussion of confidence levels in Schmalbeck,
supra note 99, at 225-28.
107. Aickin, Issues and Methods in Employment Discrimination Statistics, 26 JURIMETRICS
J. 347, 350 (1986).
108. Kaye, supra note 16, at 641.
109. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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tive probabilities to betting odds--estimates based on expected frequen-
cies, tempered by the weight of evidence. 110 "Where subjective
probabilities are defined in terms of the odds a person would be willing to
accept in betting on the outcome of an event, they can be shown to obey
all the rules of probability theory, at least where the judgments satisfy
certain conditions of consistency." '' This response will not satisfy eve-
ryone. Subjective probability theory has been described as "a danger-
ously inappropriate paradigm for the courts.""1 2 Yet as a descriptive
model, this interpretation seems to capture much of what courts actually
do when deciding the likelihood of facts argued before them.
Brilmayer and Kornhauser raise the objection that the use of statis-
tical methods may endanger the treatment of litigants as unique individu-
als.13 Indisputably, criminal convictions and civil liability must be
based on the courts' belief that particular defendants violated particular
standards. It can never be enough to say that, based on a statistical anal-
ysis, the defendant is the sort of person who is likely to commit this sort
of offense. Still, even the most individualized judgment can be redefined
as a statement about probabilities.' 4 The danger of abuse is apparent,' 5
but this is not in itself an indictment of statistical thinking. The crucial
issue is whether abuse can be avoided, keeping the system properly fo-
cused on the issue of individual responsibility.
L. Jonathon Cohen has advanced perhaps the most persistent argu-
ment that standards of proof cannot even in principle be translated into
mathematical probabilities. 1 6 Instead, Cohen has proposed his own the-
ory of "inductive" (i.e., intuitive) probability as more consistent with the
meaning of legal standards and the evaluative methods actually used in
110. Kaye, for example, has shown that subjective probability estimates obey all the classi-
cal mathematical theories and postulates. Kaye, supra note 66, at 42; Kaye, supra note 30, at
610; see also L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STAnSTICS (1954); Shafer, The Construction
of Probability Arguments, 66 B.U.L. REv. 799 (1986).
111. Kaye, supra note 66, at 43; see also Kaye, supra note 30, at 609; Finkelstein & Fairley,
A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 504 (1970).
112. Cohen, Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
627, 632.
113. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U.
CHI. L. REv. 116, 149-52 (1978).
114. This is most obvious in cases that do not require bipolar judgments-that is, when the
court must choose a value from a continuous liability function. See Thorne, Mathematics,
Fuzzy Negligence, and the Logic of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 92, 109-11 (1981).
115. The classic contemporary horror story of statistical abuse at trial is People v. Collins,
68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). The role of spurious probability esti-
mates in the Dreyfus case (1899) should also be remembered. See generally Landsman, Book
Review, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1095 (1987).
116. L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 17-39 (1977).
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trials.'17 It is undoubtedly true that courts must apply intuitive estimates
of relevant probabilities; in most cases they have no alternative. The is-
sue is whether the courts should gauge their intuitive estimates against
equally subjective standards, or against some mathematical bench-
mark. II Uncertainty is not the same thing as imprecision, nor does the
existence of uncertainty excuse imprecise thinking. A few scholars, for
example, have explored the usefulness of "fuzzy" mathematics for mod-
eling the judicial process. 19 This technique accommodates the uncer-
tainty of everyday experience and language within a precise system of
mathematical logic. One characteristic of fuzziness is that values are
usually expressed as ranges instead of points. Thus, the percentage
ranges judges assign to concepts like "beyond a reasonable doubt"'1
20
could be readily integrated into a fuzzy probability model.
Finally, it has been said that courts differ from social scientists in
that courts may not withhold judgment on disputed issues. 121 A scientist
is never required to declare the null hypothesis true if a correlation tests
out at less than the .95 confidence level; "[c]ourts, by contrast, typically
must decide between two competing alternatives."1 22 But how viable is
this distinction? In most civil and virtually all criminal trials, one party
is ex ante in possession of some contested good. If the plaintiff or the
state meets its burden of proof, the court will transfer a claim to the
defendant's property or person. If the burden is not met, the court will
refuse to impose the transfer. The latter outcome, however, does not
necessarily imply an endorsement of the defendant's position. It can be
117. See id. at 40-98.
118. "Surely, a logical methodology in support of quantitative probability measures of sig-
nificance is preferable to the subjective probability estimates of layman jurors." Smith & Char-
row, Upper and Lower Bounds for Probability of Guilt Based on Circumstantial Evidence, 70 J.
AM. STATISTICAL Assoc. 555, 559 (1975).
Although Professor Cohen has promoted his "Baconian" theory for nearly a decade (for
his latest offering see Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, 66 B.U.L. REV.
635 (1986)), it has had relatively little impact on American legal scholarship. For recent
thoughtful reevaluations of Cohen's views, see Tillers, Mapping Inferential Domains, 66 B.U.L.
R.v. 883 (1986); Allen, supra note 101, at 415-25. More critical appraisals have been leveled
by Fienberg, Misunderstanding, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 66 B.U.L. REV. 651 (1986) and
Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 66
B.U.L. REv. 657 (1986). David Schum has suggested that Cohen's approach to probabilities
may be superior at certain stages of the judicial process, while Pascalian, Bayesian and other
probability systems are better suited for other stages. Schum, Probability and the Processes of
Discovery, Proof, and Choice, 66 B.U.L. REv. 825 (1986).
119. E.g., Thorne, supra note 114.
120. See Simon, supra note 40.
121. E.g., Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1098 (1985).
122. Id. at 1100.
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no more than an acknowledgment that the case was not well enough
presented to warrant disturbing the status quo. Judgments for defend-
ants are thus closely analogous to a researcher's failure to reject a null
hypothesis.
4. Systematic inferential error
Modem cognitive research has shown that systematic biases are
often present in subjective probability estimates by laymen and experts
alike.123 Properly developed, these findings might raise grave doubts as
to the capacity of judges and juries to do the job the system assigns to
them.124 One area of special concern, from the standpoint of probabilis-
tic models, is evidence that subjects tend to ignore or underutilize base
rate data in estimating the likelihood of specific events.125 Moreover, ex-
perimental studies indicate that subjective probability estimates tend to
be "conservative"-significantly underestimating the true likelihood of
events that are very highly probable-and are only reluctantly revised
toward better estimates.
1 2 6
The adversary system ultimately relies on the diligence of counsel to
bring out information and minimize error. However, advocates have
powerful incentives to induce inferential errors in their favor, and gener-
123. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124 (1974); see also, Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430 (1972); Tversky & Kahneman, Belief in
the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 105 (1971). The first major crossover
work applying inferential error theory to the law was R. NISBETr & L. ROSS, HUMAN INFER-
ENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980). (Some of the under-
lying research had previously been discussed in Shoben, Book Review, 59 B.U.L. REv. 582
(1979)). The Nisbett & Ross book was introduced to the legal literature by Spitzer, Book
Review, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1621 (1981), and Loftus & Beach, Human Inference and Judg-
menL" Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 34 STAN. L. REv. 939 (1982). Victor Gold has
waged an unjustifiably lonely campaign to apply this research to the interpretation of eviden-
tiary rules. Gold, supra note 89; Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the
Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497 (1983).
124. "If people are, in general, prone to commit inferential error by relying on judgmental
heuristics, there is no reason to believe that such erring will suddenly cease once people be-
come jurors." Spitzer, supra note 123, at 1627. Procedural and other reforms to mitigate the
effects of cognitive bias, although arguably premature, have been proposed by, for example,
Spitzer, supra note 123, at 1634-35; Loftus & Beach, supra note 123, at 949-50; and Saks &
Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & SoC'Y
REV. 123 (1981).
125. See R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 123, at 141-50; Tversky & Kahneman, Eviden-
tial Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 19
(D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky, eds., 1982); Saks & Kidd, supra note 124.
126. See, eg., Fairley, Probabilistic Analysis of Identification Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
493, 494-95 (1973); Edwards, Conservatism In Human Information Processing, in FORMAL
REPRESENTATIONS OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 17 (B. Kleinmuntz ed., 1968).
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ally lack the training to counter such errors generated by their oppo-
nents. 127 Do attorneys routinely (if unconsciously) exploit jurors'
propensity to err, and if so, do existing rules and procedures implicitly
recognize and offset the practice? These are important empirical ques-
tions that have not been adequately tested.
If inferential bias is as universal as the literature suggests, it may
actually be less damaging to the statistical paradigm than to alternative
decision models. The essence of the problem is that factfinders seem to
systematically err in interpreting evidence. If true, this phenomenon can
in principle be taken into account by a model that incorporates the
known risk of judicial error. In contrast, models based on the myth of
certainty are unable to accommodate the effects of inferential error.
III. THE ERROR FRONTIER AND ATTAINABLE ACCURACY
A. Error in the Law: A Reinterpretation
Any factfinding system will generate two kinds of outcomes: some
that are correct and some that are in error. "Correct" judgments can be
defined as those that would have come out the same if all relevant facts
were known with certainty. In contrast, "errors" are outcomes that dif-
fer from those that would have been reached under conditions of cer-
tainty. Erroneous outcomes can be divided into Type I and Type II
errors, depending on whether they go against the defendant or the plain-




E =YD + 5P. (2)
K: the total number of cases decided in some time period t;
C: the number of correct decisions;
E: the number of erroneous decisions;
D: the number of cases in which judgment would be for the
defendant under conditions of certainty;
P: the number of cases in which judgment would be for the
plaintiff under conditions of certainty;
Y: the probability of error when the defendant is in fact
innocent;
8: the probability of error when the defendant is in fact guilty
or liable.
127. Gold, Jury Wobble, supra note 89, at 399.
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The mix of Type I and Type II errors comprising E depends on the
proportion of litigated cases in which the defendant is actually innocent
and on the relative values of the coefficients y 12 8 and 8.129 In the ex-
treme case where no innocent defendant is tried, all errors would be Type
II errors, and E = 8P. At the other extreme, if all defendants were actu-
ally innocent, there would be only Type I errors, and E = YD. Holding
K constant, these two extremes can be graphed as the vertical and hori-
zontal axes of a decision space (see Figure 3a). The various possible
combinations of cases,
K[i] = D[i] + P[i] (3)
can be represented by points along line K (see Figure 3b).
128. Y is a function of a, see supra note 60 and accompanying text, but is not identical to a.
Since a measures the proportioh of all innocent potential defendants who would be mistakenly
held liable, r would be identical to a only if all such cases (or a representative sample) were
litigated to a decision. This is unlikely for several reasons. In some cases, the potential plain-
tiff's litigation costs would exceed the expected value of a favorable decision. Moreover, many
disputes are settled without litigation, or at least before they are litigated to a decision.
Changes in the cost of litigation or in the efficiency of settlement may affect r, but not a. See
G. TULLOCK, supra note 49, at 28.
Notice also that the placement of the burden of proof would cause some marginal diver-
gence of Y from the "pure" expectation given by a, even if all cases were litigated. See supra
text accompanying notes 50-53.
129. The relationship of 8 to j3 is analogous to that of r to a. See supra note 128.
















Each of these combinations would entail a given degree of error. For
each possible combination K [i], the corresponding expected error (E [i]
= YD [i] + 8P [i]) can be located on a ray from the origin (see Figure
3c). The set of all possible points E [i] graphically defines an "error fron-
tier," shown as the heavy line E in Figure 3d. 130 The shaded area below
E represents the minimum overall risk of error in the system.13 1 Reduc-
ing this risk (or increasing the probability of correct outcomes) would
require an accuracy that is not attainable under prevailing institutional,
130. Somewhat similar graphic devices are used by Heiner, supra note 11, at 227, and Tribe,
supra note 64, at 1386-87. Heiner's reliability curves, based on signal detection theory, show
the probability of error as a function of the frequency of decisions using given information.
Tribe's preference contours and "empirical" possibility curves give the proportion of mistaken
convictions (i.e., Y) as a function of the proportion of correct convictions (i.e., 1 -). Tribe
varies procedural rules and other constraints along a given curve, while these are held constant
in the construction of the error frontier.
131. Total Risk:
K
R = I (rD[i] + 5P[K-i]).
1=0
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informational and behavioral constraints.132 Therefore, the frontier can
also be considered the boundary of the feasible set of correct outcomes










132. Reduced information costs, for example, should improve the overall accuracy of deci-
sions, lowering both Y and 8 and shifting the error frontier back toward the origin. This result
could follow from increasing the quantity and quality of evidence produced at trial, or by
clarifying the standards of liability. Epstein makes the latter point in calling for simultaneous
reduction of both types of error in judicial review of economic regulation. Epstein, supra note
61. Cf Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257,
264 (1974); Friedman, supra note 65, at 23. But cf. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 68-69 (1977) (arguing that the efficiency of
legal rules is not necessarily associated with their clarity).




FIGURE 3d: The Error Frontier
The error frontier is drawn here as a straight line, but it may in fact
be convex, concave or irregular. A linear E implies that Y and 5 do not
vary with the relative proportion of cases that are litigated. The reasona-
bleness of this assumption depends on the parties' attitudes toward risk
and the efficiency of the settlement process. If cases came to trial ran-
domly, the expected risk of error would be the same for all D[i] and P[i].
But in reality, cases are selected for litigation only after passing through
a filter of pre-trial negotiations. A vigorous body of literature on the
theory of legal settlement exists, 133 but little of it directly addresses the
133. See, e.g., Ordover & Rubinstein, A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Infor-
mation, 51 Q. J. ECON. 879 (1986); Rosenberg & Shavell, A Model In Which Suits Are Brought
For Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985); Bebehuck, Litigation and Settle-
ment Under Imperfect Competition, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); P'ng, Strategic Behavior in
Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983); Priest, Regulating the Content and
Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis, 1 Sup. Cr. ECON. REV. 163 (1982); Shavell, Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of
Legal Costs, I 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); Cooter & Marks with Mnookin, Bargaining in the
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relationship between the decision to litigate and the risk of judicial er-
ror.134 This question will not be pursued further here, since the analysis
in this Article will hold for all symmetrical frontiers.
B. Burdens and Standards of Proof
The placement of the burden of proof always has some effect on the
relative risks of Type I and Type II error in the legal system. 35 Shifting
the burden between the parties will trade off one type of risk for the
other, but will have no direct effect on the total risk of error.1
3 6
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 243-44
(1982); Ordover, On the Consequences of Costly Litigation In the Model of Single Activity Acci-
dents: Some New Results, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1981).
134. The strongest case for convexity follows from Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-15 (1984) (arguing that litigated cases will not be a
representative sample of disputes). In their model, the composition of cases shifts to maintain
an approximately equal distribution of outcomes. Id. at 4-5. Cases closest to the decision
standard (thus involving the greatest likelihood of error) are most likely to be litigated. Id. at
14-15. Equal probability of outcomes is disputed by Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for
Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985), but his analysis also arguably leads to a convex
error frontier. In contrast, Posner argues that the highest-stakes cases are the most likely to be
litigated, that parties spend the most on such cases and thereby place the most data in evi-
dence, and consequently that these cases are most likely to be decided correctly. R. POSNER,
supra note 21, at §§ 21.5, 21.8. This would imply a concave error frontier. The same result is
reached from the opposite direction by D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16-17
(1983) (holding that the most uncertain claims are likeliest to be settled because of the high
cost of litigating them). Finally, Tullock contends that cases with both very high and very low
risks of error will be settled, and only moderately risky claims will be litigated. G. TULLOCK,
supra note 49, at 24-29. Such a model would be consistent with a linear frontier.
Most of the settlement literature focuses on selection of cases for litigation without clearly
distinguishing the risk of error. Priest's analysis suggests the most difficult cases are the most
likely to be litigated to a decision, since they would involve the greatest difference between
plaintiffs' and defendants' expected outcomes. Priest, supra note 133. But Rizzo shows this
does not follow, given rational expectations and risk neutrality, or when the parties have access
to different information. Rizzo, Can There Be a Principle of Explanation In Common Law
Decisions? A Comment On Priest, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1980). Others have maintained that
the selection of cases is biased in favor of decisions for plaintiffs, since attorneys working on
contingent fees will reject or settle cases where the chances of success are small. See Orloff &
Stedinger, supra note 68. It has also been argued that the distribution of trial outcomes is
biased in favor of the party with the greater economic stake in the decision or in the outcome
of future cases of the same type. See Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of
Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 51, 55-56 (1977). But it is problematic whether such outcome biases would have
a systematic effect on the shape of the error frontier.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
136. Realigning the relative risks of Type I and Type II error may, however, induce changes
in the volume and composition of cases coming to trial in subsequent time periods. See, e.g.,
Salop & White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L. J. 1001, 1055
(1986); Craswell & Calfee, supra note 18, at 279; see also R. POSNER, supra note 21, § 21.5; G.
TULLOCK, supra note 49, at 28, 76; Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning
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Figure 4a illustrates the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion
from defendants to plaintiffs. Initially, the error frontier is the broken
line T A &A; the new frontier is the solid line Y-, 8- ,. Shifting the bur-
den reduces the risk of Type I error, 3 ' but increases the risk of Type II
error by an equivalent amount.1 38 Overall risk of error is diminished by
the area of triangle R1, but increased by area R2; the total area beneath
the error frontier remains constant. Shifting the burden from plaintiffs to
defendants follows the same analysis in reverse. No matter who wins the
ties, the total risk of error is unchanged.
from Wittman's Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 221 (1985); Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the
Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1048 (1985). The effect is somewhat analogous to shifting the
liability for court costs and litigation fees. See Posner, supra note 24, at 428; Cooter & Marks
with Mnookin, supra note 133, at 244-45; cf. Ordover, supra note 133, at 277-79; Priest, supra
note 133. These indirect effects cannot be modeled without incorporating a settlement theory,
which is beyond the scope of this Article.
137. Type I risk is reduced by (Y - ,) D [i].
138. Type II risk is reduced by (b, 82) : P[i].
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D FIGURE 4b: Stricter Standard-Plaintiff's Burden
Yp
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In contrast, changes in the standard of proof will directly affect the
total risk of error. Error is minimized by the preponderance standard;
requiring more stringent proof inevitably increases Type II error by more
than it reduces Type I error.13 9 Figure 4b shows the effect of changing
from the preponderance standard (Y,, Spi) to the clear-and-convincing
standard (Y, 9,~) when the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Requiring
plaintiffs to prove their case by a clear and convincing margin decreases
the chance that blameless defendants will be mistakenly held liable. But
this reduction is not as great as the increased risk that guilty defendants
139. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 13, at 822-23; Brook, supra note 30, at 86; Kaye, Book Re-
view, supra note 30, at 605 n.19; Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding.. A
Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach, 1969 TOLEDO L. REV. 539, 569; Lempert,
supra note 121, at 1133-34; Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note I111, at 508. Although the pre-
ponderance standard minimizes total errors, it does not necessarily distribute errors equally
between plaintiffs and defendants. See, e.g., Brook, supra note 30, at 106-08. Nor does it
necessarily minimize the number of very costly errors. See Orloff' & Stedinger, supra note 68.
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will avoid liability."4 Graphically, total error is increased to the extent
that area R2 exceeds R1.





R 2  N
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Figure 4c shows the effect of the same change of standards when the
burden of persuasion rests with the defendant. In this case, Type I risk is
increased by more than the reduction in Type II risk, again resulting in
greater total risk of error.
C. Uncertain Rules
Uncertainty in the law is partly a function of the specification of
legal rules. Uncertainty can be aggravated by imprecise wording in a
statute or decision, or by unsettled judicial doctrines. If the standard of
liability for a given offense is frequently revised, the effect on uncertainty
140. I.e., (Y, - Yo) fD[i] <.(5, - 5,) fPi].
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will be much the same as if the standard were vaguely drafted. 4' When
rules are not clearly specified, neither litigants nor the courts may know
whether certain behavior will result in liability. This will generally have
the effect of increasing both Y and 8,142 shifting the error frontier out-
ward (see Figure 5). Increased uncertainty may leave the slope of the
frontier unchanged, or it may increase the risk of one type of error by




FIGURE 5: Effect of Increased Uncertainty
D. The Example of Defamation Law
Applying the foregoing analysis to defamation law leads to surpris-
141. One important distinction exists. Vague drafting is ultimately constrained by the void-
for-vagueness doctrine; the vagueness of unsettled rules is not.
142. Uncertain standards will increase the variance of the distributions in Figure 2. If the
mean apparent liability remains the same for both classes of defendant, the two distributions
will overlap to a greater extent, increasing a and fl. Ceteris paribus, this will also raise the
values of r and 8. See supra notes 128-29.
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ing conclusions. Under the common law, publishing a written defama-
tion was a strict liability tort.143 Truth and privilege were the only
defenses. 1" Plaintiffs had to prove injury; defendants had to prove justi-
fication. In 1964 the Supreme Court began a piecemeal expansion of the
class of defamations that could be published without liability. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan"'4 was the landmark case where the Court held
that public officials could not recover for defamatory falsehoods concern-
ing their official conduct, absent a showing of "actual malice." 1" Actual
malice was defined as knowledge of or reckless disregard as to a state-
ment's falsity. 47 The burden of proving actual malice was placed on the
plaintiff. 48 The apparent rationale for this change was that requiring
defendants to prove the truth of their statements imposed too high a cost,
in the risk of erroneous judgments for plaintiffs. 49
143. Sheer & Zardkoohi, supra note 70, at 369 n.4.
144. Id. at 370. The privilege defense can be ignored for the present analysis.
145. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
146. Id. at 280.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 281.
149. The risk of erroneous verdicts for plaintiffs is implicit in the Court's concern with
possible "chilling" effects and the need to provide "breathing room" for constitutionally pro-
tected speech. See, eg., Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
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FIGURE 6a: Component Effects of Sullivan
In adopting the actual malice standard, the Court presumably in-
tended the effect diagrammed in Figure 6a. Under the common-law
standard, Y, gave the probability of mistakenly holding a defendant lia-
ble for publishing a true statement; 81 gave the risk that a defendant
would not be held liable for publishing a falsehood. Under the actual
malice rule, some true statements that are mistakenly judged false will be
held non-malicious, thereby decreasing the risk of Type I error to Y 2.1 10
Correspondingly, some false statements published with actual malice will
be ruled non-malicious, increasing Type II risk to 52. Giving the plaintiff
the burden of proving actual malice causes a further reduction in Type I
risk, to Y23, with an equivalent rise in Type II risk, to 53.151 Finally, rais-
ing the standard of proof to clear and convincing causes yet another re-
150. Outcomes that are correct for the wrong reasons are not counted as errors.
151. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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alignment in the frontier, to "?4 8'4.152 The net effect, as shown in Figure
6b, is a significant reduction in the risk of error in favor of plaintiffs (R1),







FIGURE 6b: Net Effect of Sullivan
Of course, some cases that would have been decided correctly under
the common law will result in Type I error under Sullivan. These cases
involve falsehoods published without malice that are mistakenly held to
be malicious. The erroneous appearance of malice was irrelevant under
the old rule, but now results in liability where, under the actual malice
standard, none should accrue. Conversely, some non-malicious false-
hoods that would have escaped liability at common law by being ad-
judged true (Type II error) will count as correct decisions under the
152. See supra text accompanying note 150.
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malice standard. 15 3 These effects will rotate the error frontier back to-
ward its initial position, as shown in Figure 6c.
153. The effect of adding an "absence of malice" defense is to create a third category of
defamatory statements in addition to those that are simply true or false. The effect of this




TRUE CL: Correct CL: Type I CL: Type I
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STATE
OF THE FALSE CL: Type I CL: Correct CL: Correct
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FALSE CL: Type I CL: Correct CL: Correct
(Malice) M: Type II M: Type II M: Correct
CL: Common Law Standard M: Malice Standard
The offsetting effects of introducing the malice standard can be highlighted simply:
CHARACTERIZATION
















FIGURE 6c: Offsetting Effects in Sullivan
The extent of this offsetting rotation is indeterminate. The heightened
Type I risk of holding innocently false statements to be malicious (T 5 -
T 4, Figure 6c) may arguably be greater than the reduced risk of holding
some true statements to be false (T 1 - Y 2 , Figure 6a). This is because
malice is a mental state, proof of which is inherently subject to greater
uncertainty than the fact of publishing a false statement. 154 This raises
the possibility that, by itself, adopting the actual malice standard may
have actually increased the risk of Type I error in libel actions by public
officials. Any net decline in the risk of mistaken liability stems entirely
from the accompanying changes in the burden and standard of proof.
IV. CONCLUSIONS, CONFLICTS, CAVEATS
Tracing the incidence and consequences of legal error can quickly
154. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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become a very complex matter. The first step in advancing our under-
standing is to lay aside the myth that systematic legal errors do not oc-
cur. The second step is to incorporate predictable error into our models
of legal decision-making. This Article has been addressed mainly to
these preliminary issues.
It seems clear that error minimization often conflicts with other val-
ues in the legal system. A fully developed model should help us evaluate
these trade-offs by identifying the actual costs and benefits involved.
Consider again the recurring example of defamation law. One response
to my analysis of the malice standard 1" is to observe that this test was
intended to advance values other than accuracy. For example, although
the malice standard may have increased the proportion of Type I errors
in defamation cases, 56 it has presumably reduced the proportion of de-
fendants found guilty. 57 This follows from the qualitative difference be-
tween the Type I errors eliminated by adopting the new standard, and
those created by it. The reduction in risk given by T, - Y 2 in Figure 6a
represents a decrease in the expected proportion of convictions. The off-
setting increase (? 4 - Y5, Figure 6c) consists only of a change in classi-
fication; a certain number of convictions that would have been counted
as correct under the old standard will be counted as errors under the new
one. If the Court's goal was merely to reduce the likelihood of convic-
tion, the malice standard could therefore be considered successful regard-
less of its effect on judicial accuracy. However, this leaves open the
question of whether this objective could have been accomplished by other
means entailing a lesser cost of error (say, by simply elevating the stan-
dard of proof). It is always appropriate to examine the effect of a rule on
the magnitude and distribution of error. Without such an evaluation, it
is impossible to judge how closely a given standard approaches a genuine
social optimum.
As a guide to policy, error minimization generally points toward
clearer rules, fewer rules, or no rules at all."8 Thus, error minimization
may directly conflict with the law's deterrence and social incentive val-
ues. As Craswell and Calfee have shown, increasing the clarity of rules
can lead to either over- or underdeterrence of proscribed behavior.1' 9
155. See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.
156. See supra text accompanying note 154.
157. This would have been the case if the amount of defamation and litigation remained
constant. But the uncertainty created by the malice standard may have increased either or
both of these variables, leaving the overall effect indeterminate.
158. See D'Amato, supra note 134, at 45-51.
159. Craswell & Calfee, supra note 18; cf. Johnston, Uncertain Fact-Finding and Efficiency:
Toward a General Economic Theory of Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 137 (1987); Calabresi &
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The social costs of these effects must be balanced against the benefits of
reduced error in determining the optimal level of rule uncertainty.
Finally, future models should consider endogenous effects and feed-
backs that have not been treated here. For example, the quality and
quantity of evidence may often respond to shifts in the burden of proof-
especially the burden of production. This may either increase or de-
crease the total risk of error, in contrast to the assumptions of this Arti-
cle.160 Such effects must ultimately be included in comprehensive models
of the legal process.
Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 617-19 (1985); Calfee &
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance With Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv.
965 (1984); Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of Uncertainty in the Concept of Law, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 195 (1980).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
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